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1. Introduction 
This chapter addresses issues that lie at the intersection between intellectual property rights 
(IPR) and network effects, especially in the context of the global economy. Some of the relevant 
questions are: (1) How do IPR influence the provision of goods exhibiting network effects?  (2) 
How do network effects in turn influence the creation of intellectual property (IP)? And (3) how do 
aspects of the global economy interact with both IPR and network effects? We synthesize what is 
known from the existing literature to answer these questions.1 
1.1 Outline of the Issue 
Katz and Shapiro (1985) define that a good has (positive) network effects if its utility to each 
single user increases with the number of users consuming it.2 Common examples are 
communication devices such as telephones, fax machines, and computers. Obtaining one such 
machine serves little purpose, if no other users have a compatible one. Cultural goods also tend to 
have consumption network effects. For example, one reason why we watch sports is to be able to 
discuss them with friends. Language is both a communication device and a cultural good, for its 
usefulness to a speaker relates directly to the number of people who understand it. 
The foregoing are all examples of so-called direct network effects. Katz and Shapiro also 
define indirect network effects, which occur when complementary products or infrastructure are 
needed in order to use a good. For example, software needs hardware, electrical machinery needs 
                                                 
1  We do not attempt to cover all of the available literature. For a summary on IPR, see Menell and Scotchmer (2007). 
Maskus (2000) provides a comprehensive overview of all the issues of IPR in the global economy. An early review 
of the literature on network effects can be found in David and Greenstein (1990). For a recent comprehensive review, 
see Farrell and Klemperer (2007). 
2  See Liebowitz and Margolis (1994) for a discussion on network effects versus network externalities. 
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electricity, and automobiles need gasoline and service stations. The higher the quality and the wider 
the variety of the complementary products, the higher is the willingness to pay for the original 
product.  
Many – although not all – of the goods that exhibit network effects are technologically 
sophisticated. As such they tend to have the following characteristics. First, many are goods where 
the creation and protection of IP is of paramount importance. Second, for complementary products 
to work properly with each other, an interface between different types of products needs to be 
defined. The specifications of these interfaces are frequently established as standards. If different 
countries adopt different standards, trade in products adhering to standards is affected. Since this 
influences the size of a given network, social welfare changes beyond the usual relative cost 
considerations. 
How do IPR interact with network effects in the global economy? Note that insufficient IPR 
protection in a country may affect the provision of complementary infrastructures, goods and 
services needed for the consumption of a good. For example, software makers may be reluctant to 
supply in countries where a single copy can be pirated into millions of copies. This reduces the 
potential consumption network effects for hardware users. Therefore, one might favor complete and 
universal coverage of IPR in the world as the best means to maximize (world) welfare. However, 
that view would have to be qualified, on several fronts. 
First, it is well known that in the presence of market imperfections, in particular when 
strategic interaction is important, maximizing world welfare is different from maximizing the 
welfare of any single country. Such strategic interactions are likely to be important for goods that 
exhibit network effects, since their very nature may lead to monopoly or oligopoly production. 
Moreover, dynamic effects such as “tipping” render the potential payoff for a single firm quite 
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large.3 Therefore individual countries may attempt to tip world markets towards their domestic 
network products, a strategy facilitated by sufficient IP protection. Second, standards for complex 
products often embody IP owned by firms from different countries. When establishing a standard, 
individual firms may use their IPR to bargain monopoly rents away form other firms, which in some 
cases may lead to inefficiency. Finally, it can be in firms’ own interest to have low protection of 
IPR. Firms may even condone piracy, as an effective means to enlarge their markets. This can be 
profit-maximizing, since it increases the willingness to pay of legitimate consumers. Furthermore, if 
tipping is expected, firms may allow piracy to cause tipping in favor of their network products. 
We conclude, therefore, that the interaction of network effects and IP issues is both important 
and complex to analyze. Goods that embody both are globally ubiquitous and economically 
important. It is this interaction that we address in this chapter.  
1.2. Empirical Evidence on Networks Effects  
Much of the evidence on goods with network effects, and on IP issues of such goods, has 
been gathered in the information technology sector. For example, Gandal (1994) estimates a hedonic 
pricing model for the market for spreadsheets, which in the time period concerned (1986-1991) was 
dominated by one product Lotus 1-2-3. Besides using variables that measure the desirability of 
different spreadsheets,4 he includes a variable for compatibility with the Lotus format, and a 
variable for whether the program can link with external databases. His results suggest that the latter 
two characteristics enhance the value of a spreadsheet. Arguably, the first characteristic measures 
direct network effects, while the second measures indirect network effects. 
                                                 
3  Tipping can occur when two or more network technologies compete with each other, such as Apple PCs versus 
WINTEL PCs (those that use Intel Processors and the Microsoft Windows Operating System). One system’s small 
advantage leads all new complementary goods producers or consumers to join the marginally stronger system. 
4  For example, whether the spreadsheet can recalculate automatically when new entries are made,,sort data on at least 
two levels and has basic graphic capabilities. 
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Givon et al. (1995) adopt a more structural approach to estimating network effects. They also 
investigate the influence of piracy on legitimate purchases. Specifically, they set up a diffusion 
model for the markets for spreadsheets and word processors in the United Kingdom and then fit it to 
the data. Their results indicate that over 80 percent of software purchases between 1987 and 1992 
were influenced by pirates through word-of-mouth. While this is evidence of a network effect, it 
also highlights the importance of piracy. Interestingly, word-of-mouth influence by pirates and 
legitimate users is practically indistinguishable, indicating that all users (legitimate or not) 
participate in the same network. 
Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996), like Gandal (1994), also estimate a hedonic pricing model 
for spreadsheets. However, they use a more direct measure of network effects. While Gandal’s 
measure is based on features of the software (compatibility with the Lotus format may be a desirable 
characteristic in itself), Brynjolfsson and Kemerer  use the market share of each product as an 
explanatory variable (they also use a measure of compatibility with the Lotus program). Their 
results indicate that an increase of one percent in market share of a product leads to a 0.75 percent 
increase in its price, which is consistent with network effects in this market. 
More recently, Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007) analyze the impact of illegal music file 
downloads on legal sales of music. Since downloads have no effect on sales, they interpret this as 
the net result of two opposing mechanisms: downloads replace sales; but they also create network 
effects through word-of-mouth promotion for good songs, which enhances sales.  
We conclude that there is evidence for the presence of consumption network effects in the 
software and music industries. At a more macro level, we have found no direct evidence on the 
importance of network effects in international trade or foreign direct investment. Nor is there any 
direct evidence on how important IPR are for network goods. However, some indirect evidence can 
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be gleaned from data on pirated goods. The value of worldwide sales in pirated and counterfeit 
goods is estimated to be around $650 billion, more than double the amount of illicit drug trade and 
roughly seven percent of world trade (Havoscope 2006). While these estimates may be imprecise, 
virtually all counterfeit and pirated products can be sorted into three categories: branded final 
products such as clothes and cosmetics, branded parts, such as those for cars and airplanes, and 
complementary products, such as software, videogames and DVDs. As we argue below, all of these 
types of products are likely to exhibit direct or indirect network effects. IPR issues are also likely to 
be important for all types, hence the focus in this chapter: goods that exhibit network effects and 
that have a strong IP content.  
 
2. Basic Concepts and Definitions 
A network is a system composed of nodes and links between nodes. Network effects exist 
when adding to the size of a network increases the value of each node.5 Network effects can arise in 
complementary-goods relationships.  For example, the more software varieties are developed for a 
particular hardware, the more consumers value the hardware. The higher level of hardware 
consumption in turn increases the incentives for software producers to develop new varieties 
(Church and Gandal 1992) or higher qualities (Markovich and Moenius 2006a) compatible with the 
hardware. Such systems of complementary technologies and products are called platforms, defined 
                                                 
5  The industrial organization literature defines network effects strictly in the context of the demand side (also referring 
to them as “economies of scale in consumption”), while attributing all comparable production-side effects to 
economies of scale and scope.  However, some of the phenomena that we review in this chapter (for example, in 
research networks) are hard to describe solely through economies of scale or scope, and are equivalent in nature to 
demand-side network effects. Therefore, similarly to Love and Roper (2001), Mika et al. (2006) and Rauch (2001), 
we will refer to those factors as network effects. In this chapter, we generally assume that network effects exist, 
instead of deriving them explicitly from the network structure. See Economides (1996) for a discussion of assumed 
versus derived network effects.  
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by Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999) as a technology around which buyers and sellers coordinate 
efforts.6 This broad definition includes any kind of component that a technology may require. For 
example, computer platforms include hardware, software, operating systems, peripherals, network 
connections, services, and so on. Adding and improving complementary components increases the 
value of a platform. 
To ensure interoperability of all complementary components, interfaces are necessary. If an 
interface is to be shared among a variety of components, an interface standard needs to be specified 
to ensure that the components work adequately with each other. This standard can be proprietary or 
freely accessible. Proprietary standards are called “closed,” all others “open.” If the owner of a 
closed standard keeps it in-house, then innovation around the standard occurs only within the firm. 
Alternatively, the firm may license a standard, allowing the development of components by others. 
By contrast, open standards allow free competition in the component market. Thus, closed standards 
can be used to limit competition. 
A distinction should be made between de jure and de facto standards, which can be 
understood in light of network effects. De jure standards arise through an explicit standardization 
policy by governments towards an industry to ensure minimum quality or safety, but also to increase 
network effects and thus social welfare. On the other hand, the network effect itself may help to 
expand the reach of a technology until it becomes so dominant that it is called a de facto standard. A 
third category is called institutional standards. These are developed by committees within standards-
setting bodies such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).7 The application of 
these standards is voluntary in principle, but it is frequently mandatory as part of contractual 
                                                 
6  For a different use of the term technology platform, see Economides and Katsamakas (2006). 
7  See Farrell and Saloner (1988) for a formal analysis of standards choice in committees. 
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obligations. Sometimes institutions develop standards upon requests by governments. These norms 
then become de jure standards.  
Institutions that develop standards can operate at the industry, country or international level, 
depending on what level the network effects are expected to emerge. This is related to the scope of a 
network, which refers to its relevant size for each consumer (Katz and Shapiro 1985) and can thus 
be interpreted as a measure of the extent of the network effect enjoyed by consumers. The scope 
may consist of only one brand if different brands are mutually incompatible. It may also be an 
industry or a sub-sector thereof. The former is more likely when a single standard is shared across 
the industry. Software provides examples of different levels of scopes.  While the Windows 
operating system has become a global standard, some application programs only have national 
benefits (e.g., tax software), or may matter only locally for some users (e.g.. document exchange 
within one’s circle of friends) while mattering globally for others (e.g., document exchange across 
international organizations).  Katz and Shapiro discuss the relationship between the scope of a 
network and the adoption of a standard in the context of firms’ decisions on compatibility with one 
another. They find that firms with the best reputations may choose degrees of compatibility that are 
below the social optimum, and vice-versa for less reputed firms. It is further useful to distinguish 
whether the scope of a network is national or international, since consequences of IP protection 
differ for global versus local networks.   
Network effects also raise questions about efficiency, since the adopted standard may not be 
the best possible. That may happen because imperfectly informed or corrupt governments adopt the 
wrong (de jure) standard, or because lock-in effects cause an inferior (de facto) standard to become 
Networks, Standards and Intellectual Property Rights page 8 
 
prevalent.8 There is a debate in the literature over whether the adoption of inferior standards has 
actually occurred. While David (1985) and Diamond (1997) argue that the QWERTY keyboard was 
adopted despite its technological inferiority, Liebowitz and Margolis (1990, 1994) challenge this 
view. Katz and Shapiro (1986) study the dynamics of technology adoption in industries with 
network effects. In their model several incompatible technologies compete in the market place, and 
de facto standardization may be achieved through the locking in of one of the technologies. Whether 
the market chooses the socially optimal standard may also depend on the IPR ownership structure. 
For example, if the inferior technology is owned by a firm, while the superior technology is not 
owned by anyone, the former may gain predominance through sponsorship by its owner.  
A common feature of platform development is cumulative innovation, such as the constant 
development and improvement of components that are close substitutes for each other. One example 
is the myriad of CD-players that are marketed, all able to play the same CDs, due to the existence of 
a common data-encoding standard. Similarly, Economides (1996) describes the information 
superhighway to consist of “substitutes of complements.” Cumulative innovation benefits from 
knowledge spillovers, which frequently take place within research networks. By analogy with the 
language of platforms for complementary goods, we call research networks knowledge platforms, 
which are then defined as networks of researchers and engineers, all interested in the development of 
a common area of knowledge around which they coordinate their research efforts. If the skills and 
know-how of those researchers are complementary, then adding researchers to a knowledge 
platform extends the available skill-pool to all researchers in the network. Thus, network effects 
exist in the creation of IP when cumulative innovation is present. 
                                                 
8  See Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1986) for a model of this effect. 
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The creation of IP within knowledge platforms can occur even for products that do not 
exhibit network effects. At the same time, IP for goods that do exhibit network effects can be 
created by actors that do not participate in knowledge platforms. Thus, there is no one-to-one 
correspondence between knowledge platforms and products that exhibit network effects. However, 
since cumulative innovation is common for such products, knowledge platforms frequently arise for 
their creation. 
Network effects exist not only in the creation but also in the diffusion of IP, where such 
effects are significant and best studied in the context of ethnic networks. Ethnic networks may 
constitute a substantial part of knowledge platforms (Kerr 2006). Using patent citations, Kerr (2007) 
finds strong and significant international technology transfer through ethnic scientific communities, 
with measurable effects on manufacturing output in the recipient countries. Besides patentable 
technology, other information relevant to doing business abroad may be exchanged in ethnic 
networks, with measurable effects on international trade flows (Rauch and Trindade 2002).9  
In sum, we argue that network effects in the global economy exist both in the creation and 
transmission of IP as well as in the consumption of a broad range of goods, many of which 
frequently carry a high IP content. Due to the need for cumulative innovation in network industries, 
knowledge platforms are often the relevant structure to create IP in those industries. In spite of this 
fact, it is methodologically most appropriate to analyze the relevant effects one at a time. Thus, the 
remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  First, we discuss the interaction between network 
effects and IPR, followed by an analysis of network effects in knowledge platforms.  Then we 
discuss some specifics of network industries and how they are influenced by IPR in the global 
                                                 
9  The mechanism in such networks is similar to that of research networks: adding reliable international traders to the 
network increases the probability of a successful deal for all members. Thus ethnic networks, for example, exhibit a 
direct network effect. 
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context. Next we present issues of strategic choice of IPR protection for network industries. The last 
section provides a summary of the different strands of the literature.  
 
3. Network Effects and IPR  
Governments do not typically target their IPR legislation towards goods with network effects. 
However, IPR play an almost defining role in the economics of such goods. Moreover, the existence 
of network effects can, through their influence on market structure, either increase or reduce the 
value of a patent or copyright.10 On the other hand, different forms of IPR, the specifics of their 
use11 and even their infringement can enhance or reduce the strength of a network effect. Therefore 
we review in this section some possible interactions between IPR and network effects. We do so in 
three steps. First, we analyze how network effects influence the economic value of intellectual 
property rights. Next, we summarize how awarding IPR influences network industries. Then we 
describe how the relationship between network effects and IPR varies by type of policy.  
3.1. How do Network Effects Influence the Value of Intellectual Property Rights? 
Consider how network effects affect the shape of the demand curve.12 In the presence of 
network effects, an individual’s willingness to pay depends on how many other customers purchase 
the same product. So for each expected demand, there is a different downward sloping demand 
curve. Let D(p,qe) describe the demand when expected total sales equal qe. It is decreasing in its first 
argument, but, due to the network effect, increasing in the second. Several such demands are shown 
in Figure 1, for example, D1≡D(p,q1). When for a certain price p, D (p,qe) = qe, expectations are 
                                                 
10  The value of an IPR is simply measured as the discounted future monopoly rent it grants. 
11  For example, the extent to which the market power granted by them is used in licensing agreements. 
12  This description is adapted from Economides (1996). Economides and Himmelberg (1995a) provide additional 
details. 
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fulfilled and an equilibrium is reached. For example, for D1 expectations are fulfilled at q1. This 
analysis can be repeated for various expected demands, tracing out the locus p(q), which depicts the 
willingness to pay at points where expected and actual demands are the same. 
Figure 1 about here 
Suppose now that the good is competitively supplied. For a given level of (constant) marginal 
costs c, three equilibria are possible as shown in Figure 1, one at zero, one at q1 and one at q4. 
Consider first the fulfilled-expectation equilibrium at q1. Suppose that consumers revise their 
expectations slightly higher, say, to q2. Then D2 becomes the relevant demand curve. With a 
competitively supplied good, actual demand will be q3, inducing consumers to adjust their demand 
to D3, and so on. This process will only stop when consumers correctly expect the quantity 
demanded to be q4. Therefore, q1 is an unstable equilibrium, while q4 is stable. Now consider a small 
deviation to the left of q1: there, actual demand is below expected demand, which leads to an 
adjustment of expected demand downwards all the way to zero, making zero demand also a stable 
equilibrium. Thus we see that goods with network effects exhibit multiple equilibria.  
This multiplicity is important for two reasons.  First, social welfare is by no means the same 
at the two equilibria. In particular, consumer surplus is higher at q4 than q1, since more customers 
are served at the same price. Due to the larger network size, each one also receives higher utility. 
Note that producer surplus is identically zero at both equilibria. Second, nothing guarantees that the 
efficient equilibrium will be reached. In order for the system to reach the stable equilibrium q4, it is 
essential that it gathers at least q1 customers.  Customer level q1 is therefore a threshold value or 
critical mass.13  
                                                 
13  This definition of critical mass is less restrictive than that in Economides and Himmelberg (1995a), who do not take 
expectation adjustment into account and therefore define critical mass as the point where p(q) reaches a maximum. 
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How do network effects impact the value of IPR?14 IPR reward their creators with market 
power. Depending on the resulting market structure, this can make it easier or harder to reach the 
critical mass of a network. If the critical mass is not reached, any IPR specific to this network would 
have no value. If the critical mass is reached, the network effect would raise sales and thus the value 
of IPR.  
Consequently, the value of IPR embodied in a network good depends on what equilibrium 
will be reached, which in turn will depend on such factors as the institutional arrangement for 
different IP owners and the strategic interaction among them. Consider, for example, the case where 
competing but incompatible network goods can be developed. The regulator or the competitors 
themselves can choose between coordinating on one standard or allowing several specifications to 
compete for the market so that multiple standards might coexist.15 Coordination implies larger 
market size with higher network effects, and thus higher value of the IPR included in a common 
standard. Thus, institutional arrangements that encourage coordination are likely to enhance the 
expected value of an IPR.  
To examine the importance of strategic interaction, note that the expected value of an IPR 
should be reflected in its licensing contracts. However, if coordination and its outcome are 
uncertain, the determination of licensing fees becomes difficult, since the licensed technology could 
lose the market to a competing system, or more than one system could coexist, while coordination 
on this technology would promise monopoly power.16 This uncertainty may induce firms to develop 
                                                 
14  Farrell and Shapiro (2004) discuss this question in the context of information technology.  
15  Researchers interested in the differences between  adopting one standard versus multiple standards frequently cite the 
example of the GSM standard for second-generation mobile telephony in Europe, as opposed to the multiplicity of 
standards allowed to coexist in the United States (D-AMPS, GSM, CDMA2000, among others). See also Besen and 
Farrell (1994). 
16  Menell and Scotchmer (2007) provide an overview of the relevant literature on licensing issues.  
Networks, Standards and Intellectual Property Rights page 13 
 
their own proprietary technology, which can be used as a threat-point in the bargaining process in 
order to negotiate lower licensing fees. It also allows them to compete independently in the market 
should negotiations for a common standard fail. Therefore, firms are less likely to coordinate, which 
reduces the expected value of the collective IPR, both because the network effect is reduced, and 
because there is a lower probability of reaching the critical mass. 
Note that even in the absence of network effects, the value of IPR is also influenced by how 
concentrated their use is in complementary products. For example, assume IPR establish a 
monopoly for each of two complementary components that are assembled into a final good. 
Contrary to what intuition might suggest, prices in this case are higher and profits lower than if an 
integrated monopolist produced both components, a result long ago pointed out by Cournot. Thus, 
IPR held by two complementary-goods producers may have a lower value than if they are held by a 
single firm.17 Since price reductions of any component benefit the whole system, it is always 
beneficial for a monopolist if the complementary good is sold at a lower price. Therefore, 
introducing competition into the complementary market (and fending it off in one’s own 
component) is a profit-enhancing strategy even in the absence of network effects. However, network 
effects enhance the power of this strategy.  For example, Microsoft ensures competition in the 
hardware market through a Windows Compatibility Lab. This increases the network effect since it 
ensures higher sales both in hardware and in complementary software provided by Microsoft 
(Varian 2004).   
3.2. How Do Intellectual Property Rights Influence Network Effects? 
As discussed above, network effects can influence the value of IPR. But the chain of 
                                                 
17  While instructive, this result is specific to this particular market structure. For more general treatments of 
complementary relationships without network effects, see Matutes and Regibeau (1988) and Einhorn (1992). 
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causation can also run in the opposite direction. First, the concentration of IPR ownership matters 
for the creation and survival of the network. Second, optimal incentives for the creation of network 
goods depend on whether cumulative or one-step invention is required. Third, network formation 
and persistence depend on whether the IP is for interfaces or for components. The following 
exposition exemplifies these three aspects. 
3.2.A. Intellectual Property Rights  Ownership and the Creation of Networks18 
We already saw that if a network good is competitively supplied, the fragmented market may 
be unable to commit to an amount above the critical mass, preventing network formation. By 
contrast, suppose that one monopolist holds all the IPR for the good. It can commit to a price-
quantity combination that ensures an equilibrium at a quantity qm, q1 < qm < q4 in Figure 1, a level 
above the critical mass. Therefore if the development of the network good is based on one major 
invention and the inventor can establish a monopoly position, provision of the good can be 
guaranteed, albeit at a higher price than at the competitive equilibrium q4. The argument can be 
extended to cases where compatible network goods are supplied by oligopolists, as long as each 
supplier has the capability to serve the whole market (Economides and Himmelberg 1995a, 1995b).  
However, once a single supplier cannot serve the whole market, this argument fails since 
there needs to be sufficient coordination for entry into the market to reach critical mass. As market 
power reduces supply per firm, it may reduce the likelihood of reaching the critical mass. IPR 
establish market power and can thus contribute to surpassing the critical mass necessary to provide 
network goods, but can also hinder sufficient entry into the market. The higher the number of 
                                                 
18  This subsection discusses the findings in Economides (1996) in light of IPR. See also Economides and Himmelberg 
(1995a, 1995b) 
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components and the lower their degree of substitutability, the less likely it is that the critical mass 
would be reached.19   
Finally, consider two incompatible network goods competing against each other, such as two 
different hardware platforms. Incompatibility implies that the network effect only exists within each 
platform separately. In this setting, market power may still ensure that the critical mass will be 
reached. But the individual interests of firms on the same platform may weaken the network effect 
on that platform, since the exploitation of market power will lead to reduced sales. This creates the 
potential for losing the whole market to the competing platform (Markovich and Moenius 2006b). 
3.2.B. Cumulative versus One-Step Innovation and Network Effects 
Merges and Nelson (1990) argue that there are substantial differences in the nature of 
innovation for different industries. While the ballpoint pen was an innovation that reached its goal in 
one step, systems innovations, such as those seen in the computer industry, require many 
incremental improvements in components. How should IPR be designed to provide incentives in 
such a way as to encourage optimal effort of innovators in either type of innovation? 
The simple model in Farrell and Shapiro (2004) highlights the main issues. For one-step 
innovations, which require the success of one single inventor, they argue that the probability of 
individual success p(xi) is convex in effort. Innovator i’s effort, denoted by xi, is assumed to be 
proportional to the expected reward. By contrast, the case of cumulative innovation is better 
described as concave in effort. The objective function in either case is to maximize the probability of 
overall innovative success, denoted by P and is written as follows: 
                                                 
19  Similarly, in an oligopoly with quality differences across suppliers there need to be enough suppliers of sufficiently 
high quality. See Markovich and Moenius (2006a), who call the increase in the overall market size due to entry and 
quality increases of suppliers a market-extension effect. 
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( )( )∏ −−=
i
ixpP 11  ( 1 ) 
This formulation assumes that the success probabilities of inventors are independent of each 
other. Maximizing this function in xi requires xi to be as large as possible for one i and zero for all 
others if p(xi) is convex in effort. But xi should be evenly distributed if p(xi) is concave. Therefore, a 
“one size fits all” IPR-policy that encompasses both one-step and cumulative innovations cannot 
bring about optimal innovative outcomes. In the former case a maximum reward should be given to 
a single inventor, while in the latter situation rewards should be equally distributed across all 
inventors contributing to the system. 
In particular, how broad should patent protection be? Consistent with the model in Farrell 
and Shapiro (2004), Merges and Nelson (1990) argue that broad IPR scope might be warranted for 
one-step inventions, but may inhibit technical progress in cumulative inventions. This is because for 
one-step inventions, the optimal policy is to provide sufficient incentives for individual inventors, 
but is otherwise unconstrained by concerns of hindering further development of the industry. By 
contrast, suppose that a broad patent is granted to an inventor of a network component. Due to its 
breadth, the patent may prevent development of new varieties by other inventors, reducing network 
effects and possibly lowering the probability of reaching critical mass. This in turn reduces 
inventors’ incentive to invest in this network technology, slowing down technological progress.  
3.2.C. Intellectual Property Rights  and the Use of Market Power in Interfaces 
If a firm can appropriate a standard and even protect it through a set of IPR, it can obtain 
tremendous market power, as is well documented in the case of Microsoft’s Windows operating 
system (OS). However, whether the firm decides to use the standard as a source of licensing fees or 
to keep it secret depends on whether it sees the standard as its core intellectual property. For 
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example, Microsoft insisted on secrecy for its interface between its desktop OS and its server OS. 
Microsoft saw this interface as a major source of value creation, since the performance of a 
networked computer system depends on the performance of the personal computers, the server, and 
how well those two communicate. Keeping the interface at least partially secret allowed Microsoft 
to leverage its strong position in PC OS into an advantage in the market for server OS (Farrell and 
Shapiro 2004).  
A contrasting example is Intel’s licensing of its PCI bus. Intel initially developed this bus 
system because the slow development of bus systems by other firms lowered the capabilities of 
Intel’s processors. Intel licensed its PCI technology liberally, and also started producing its own PCI 
bus systems to guarantee a minimum supply and to ensure that a critical mass was reached. Thus, 
unlike Microsoft’s approach with respect to Windows, Intel viewed the IPR in its processor business 
as core and those in its PCI bus only as complementary. Intel’s information-sharing on the PCI bus 
also facilitated network effects through the development of complementary products, which further 
strengthened Intel’s market power in the processor business (Gawer and Cusumano 2002).  
Thus we conclude that firms may pursue proprietary policies in their IPR for core interfaces 
between components that the firm regards as critical sources of monopoly rents and that are made by 
the firm itself. By contrast, they may pursue a more open policy in non-core interfaces with other 
firms’ products. In the latter case, this policy may spur innovation and increase competition in 
complementary-goods markets to increase network effects for their core technologies. 
3.3. How Does the Interaction between IPR and Network Effects Vary by Type of IPR? 
In this section, we describe how the different types of IPR can differentially influence or be 
influenced by network effects. We compare the four main types of IP: patents, trade secrets, 
copyrights, and trademarks. Because these types are protected, either by firms or by governments, in 
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different ways, IP in network industries is frequently protected by a combination of rights, 
regulations, and business practices. 
Three features of patents are most relevant for our discussion: (1) they confer to their owners 
the right to exclude others from making, using or trading the patented technology (“full exclusion”); 
(2) they have an expiration date (“time limitation”); (3) the patent holder must publish detailed 
technical specifications for the technology patented (“maximum information”). 
The time limitation of patents ensures that the monopoly power granted by them does not 
extend indefinitely. The time limitation of patents contrasts favorably with copyrights, which were 
originally designed as narrow protection for authors of creative work for as long as they (and their 
heirs) lived. Nevertheless, they have recently played a role in the protection of interfaces in network 
industries. The longevity of copyrights cements dominance of existing product platforms, making it 
hard to replace them with technologically superior products that require the use of copyrighted 
information. However, in contrast to the full protection of patents, copyrights are treated differently 
by the courts. Farrell and Shapiro (2004, p. 57) report a case in the 1990s in which Lotus sued 
Borland under copyright law, accusing Borland of emulating its user interface:  
“To economists, an odd feature of the case was that Borland argued that Lotus 
had put considerable research and effort into the design of its user interface. While 
this would if anything have helped Lotus had it been a patent case, in a copyright 
case this helped Borland argue that there were no comparably efficient alternative 
interfaces, so that if Lotus got copyright protection on the interface, that would give it 
market power in a way that copyright is not meant to do.” 
 
The information published in patent applications helps researchers within the field build on 
current knowledge. However, this requirement may prevent standards owners from patenting. For 
example, if an interface was patented in its entirety, everyone would know its specifications exactly, 
which, as discussed earlier, may not be in the interests of the interface owner.  
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Contrast this feature of patents with trade secrets, defined as economically valuable 
information that is not publicly shared. Trade secrets have the following characteristics: (1) they are 
IP in a wide sense of the term; (2) they never expire; but (3) they are only protected against illegal 
discovery methods. 20 In other words, they do not enjoy the same broad protection as patents, but 
their owners are under no obligation to disclose information. If they can be effectively protected, 
they generate a formidable barrier against access to information. However, due to the lower 
protection of trade secrets, poaching may occur. In the US, a company that discovers a mechanism 
identical to one previously used by another firm and protected by a trade secret can patent its 
(re)discovery and then prevent the original firm from using the mechanism. If a firm protects the 
part of an interface it wants to be publicly known with patents, and those parts it wants to keep in-
house with trade secrets, it risks having those trade secrets being discovered and patented by another 
firm. If this happens, market power can shift rapidly. This contrasts with the market power afforded 
by patents, which support slower change. 
Finally we consider brands and trademarks. Trademarks are unique identifiers (words, logos, 
brand names, and the like) of products or organizations. They do not expire (unless they acquire a 
generic meaning, such as Kleenex for paper-tissue) and they are protected by national and 
international trademark law through registration or usage in the market place.21 Trademarks are a 
part of firms’ strategies to establish a brand. The concept of a brand, however, is much broader and 
reflects a multiplicity of information and expectations associated with a company, product or lines 
of products. Note that brands in this broad sense are not protected by IP law, while trademarks are. 
                                                 
20 In legal terms, trade secrets are protected by laws against unfair competition and fraudulent means of one firm 
acquiring another firm’s confidential business information. If the information is learned through legal means, such as 
reverse engineering, it is available for use by the acquirer.  While trade secrets are not, therefore, IPR in the strictest 
sense they do have the effect of protecting exclusive use of an undisclosed technology. 
21 Trademarks do expire if their owners choose not to incur the costs of renewing their registration. 
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Thus trademarks are the relevant legal part of a brand that can be used to fight brand imitation, but it 
is brands in their entirety that exhibit network effects.  
For example, brands may increase consumer confidence or information, and therefore the 
willingness to pay. Kerin et al. (2006, p. 300) define “brand equity,” as the “added value a given 
brand name gives to a product beyond the functional benefits provided”. Brand equity values are 
estimated to be substantial (Interbrand 2006), potentially a reflection that network effects contribute 
to them. This can be especially important in countries with inefficient market information.  For 
example, India’s house of Tata uses its brand in a vast variety of products and industries.22 By 
focusing on quality control and brand-name promotion, Tata has created a network effect, which is 
that adding product groups of reliable quality to their portfolio strengthened consumer confidence in 
the quality of other Tata products.23 The converse of these effects is also important.  Mellen and 
Scotchmer (2005) point out that trademark violations reduce the positive network effect of brands, 
thus reducing consumer confidence and willingness to pay.  
We conclude that different intellectual property rights protect different aspects of a 
technology, but also open different doors for evading protection. It is, therefore, not surprising that 
proprietary technologies, and in particular proprietary interface standards, are usually protected by a 
portfolio of patents, copyrights and trade secrets, making it hard to break the market power of such a 
standard. 
 
                                                 
22  Tata currently lists about 25 consumer product groups from agricultural appliances to watches on their webpage. 
They also offer products and services to other companies in 16 different industries. See www.tata.com for details.  
23  For a description of Tata’s strategy, see Khanna and Palepu (1997). While they do not mention network effects in 
particular, they offer a description of the mechanisms labeled here as such. Note that there are also economies of 
scale and scope in marketing efforts. Beggs (1989) explains how supply-side economies of scale can induce demand-
side network effects. Bagwell and Ramey (1994) indicate how coordination economies (essentially a network effect) 
can be realized through advertising. 
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4. Network Effects in the Creation, Dissemination and Protection of IPR 
We mentioned in the introduction that besides their role in consumption, networks play an 
important role in the creation, dissemination and protection of IPR. In this section, therefore, we 
focus on the role of networks in the process of knowledge creation and dissemination. Network 
effects that rely primarily on the consumption side are discussed in the next two sections. 
4.1. Knowledge Platforms 
Within a research field, each researcher’s knowledge is likely to be complementary to that of 
her peers. Projects that require collaborative contributions exhibit network effects in their efficacy if 
each researcher's contribution increases the productivity of others in the network. Intuitively, the 
strength of the network effect in research networks will depend on three parameters: (i) the degree of 
complementarity of knowledge; (ii) the transactions costs of coordinating different researchers, 
possibly across institutions and countries; and (iii) the quality and cost of information transmission 
within the network. These three factors also jointly determine the size of research networks (or what 
we have called knowledge platforms). The strength of the network effect and size of the network of 
researchers then determines the quality and quantity of IP created.  
We begin with a model adapted from Rauch and Watson (2007) to see how the three issues 
listed above help explain the structure of research networks. The main assumption is that research 
collaborations exhibit network effects because forming a research network delivers a higher benefit 
to participants than the sum of their separate efforts. Researchers have exogenously determined 
close ties to other researchers working in the same lab, but have the choice to engage in a costly 
search for partners in different labs. In the latter case they obtain a benefit that is more uncertain, but 
potentially greater due to higher complementarity and less overlap in knowledge. The search for 
outside partners is modeled as a random matching of researchers. Once a match is formed, the joint 
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benefit of the collaboration is revealed to both researchers, who decide to pursue the project only if 
it yields a higher benefit than working with a researcher in their own laboratories.  
Rauch and Watson further distinguish between laboratories that are close to each other 
(dubbed to be in the same cluster) or further away (said to belong to a different cluster), which 
introduces geography into the model. Researchers find the optimal search effort by equating the 
expected benefits of search to its cost. The outcome is a distribution of research collaborations 
within laboratories, between laboratories that are close by (called cluster ties) and between 
laboratories that are more distant (bridge ties). Since matching is random, the model delivers cluster 
ties and bridge ties in proportion to the size of the own cluster relative to all other clusters. With the 
help of this simple formal structure, we will now discuss the three issues relevant for the size and 
structure of the research network.  In turn, these factors influence network effects in IP creation, 
which are complementarity of knowledge, coordination costs, and information transmission. 24  
4.1.A. The Complementarity of Knowledge in Knowledge Platforms 
Researchers collaborate to reduce time to complete, to win a patent race, and to benefit from 
the exchange of ideas. They may also form partnerships both within- and across-organizations in 
order to work on complex problems that require specialization of complementary tasks.25 How does 
complementarity affect the size and the scope of the research network? What implications does it 
have for the international diffusion of technology? 
                                                 
24  Mika et al. (2006) identify both size and diversity of networks as determinants for the number of publications and 
citations of researchers. In Rauch and Watson's (2007) model, network effects arise endogenously, since an increase 
in the search effort of a single researcher increases the probability of a high-quality match for all researchers. 
25  There is evidence that knowledge creation occurs across boundaries of single organizations. For example, in 
Gittelmann’s (2007) data on biotechnology publications, 70 percent of scientific publications listed coauthors from 
more than one institution or firm, while 30 percent had authors from just one laboratory.  
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Our model assumes that distance creates a barrier to knowledge diffusion, therefore the 
knowledge of researchers located further away differs from the knowledge of local researchers.26 In 
other words, knowledge of faraway researchers is less substitutable and more complementary than 
that of local researchers, thus adding more to a project. However, there is also a risk that the 
knowledge in distant laboratories is not fully compatible and therefore may not contribute 
sufficiently to a project to make a partnership attractive. In order to get access to the distant 
complementary knowledge, firms may contribute to the increase in the size and scope of research 
networks. For example, they can reduce barriers between researchers by establishing multiple 
research facilities in different locations that tap into local knowledge resources. Baldwin and Hanel 
(2000) provide evidence that multinational companies with research facilities in Canada use local 
partners such as Canadian universities and domestic customers as sources of ideas. Local R&D 
departments of multinational firms are more often partners of R&D collaboration projects, both in 
Canada and other countries, than are R&D departments of their Canadian counterparts. In the 
language of our model, these local R&D facilities create cluster ties in their local environment, 
feeding the newly acquired knowledge through existing bridge ties to parent and sister companies. 
This is an example in which high-resistance bridge ties are internalized, while low-resistance cluster 
ties are formed wherever the multinational establishes a subsidiary.  
Note that a more international scope of research platforms – itself a consequence of the 
higher degree of complementarity of distant knowledge – immediately implies international 
technology diffusion. But diffusion is not automatic: Keller (2004) highlights the importance of 
complementary skills that must be developed locally in order to be able to absorb foreign 
                                                 
26  Gittelmann (2007) provides evidence that there is this dichotomy of distance, as well as that research collaborations 
with distant partners deliver higher-impact results.  
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technology. For this reason technology spillovers are weaker into developing countries than into 
developed countries. The literature on networks of inventors sheds light on the mechanism of these 
spillovers.  
By assumption, networks are always formed by two researchers in the Rauch and Watson 
(2007) model. Note, however that the size of research networks can vary drastically (Beaucage and 
Beaudry 2006). Likely drivers of size include the complexity of the IP to be created, the financial 
payoff expected, as well as the available complementary knowledge embedded in researchers. 
4.1.B. Coordination Costs in Networks of Researchers  
For the creation of intellectual property, researchers may form cluster and bridge ties.  
Coordination costs arise especially for the latter because researchers need to monitor each other’s 
progress, coordinate goals, and exchange information. These coordination costs are likely to limit 
the overall size of networks, vary with the structure of the network and reduce or even offset 
potential network effects. Foray and Steinmueller (2002) find that the choice of coordination 
mechanism among researchers depends on the degree of appropriability of knowledge. 
Appropriability is tightly linked with IPR, since formal codification of technology facilitates 
appropriation of each agent’s contribution.  
The choice between formal and informal research arrangements depends on whether trust 
and reciprocity can be established. Formal arrangements are more costly than informal arrangements 
and thus imply smaller networks. But high appropriability of IP in formal arrangements may allow 
the recovery of this additional cost. Informal arrangements can also exist under high appropriability, 
but under restrictive conditions.  Either partners have established trust in each other in the past or the 
IP to be exchanged must already exist. In sum, high appropriability is more often associated with 
formal arrangements and smaller network size. The opposite is true for weak appropriability, which 
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renders costly formal mechanisms inefficient. In that case, informal arrangements become the 
fallback solution, and network size can be larger due to lower coordination cost. Of course, formal 
arrangements are still possible even with weak appropriability. IPR can be pooled and jointly 
licensed or a shared benefit not directly related to the IPR exists that cannot be achieved by informal 
arrangements.  
All possible combinations of appropriability and formality are shown in Table 1. An 
example of a formal arrangement with strong appropriability is a high-tech consortium. This is a 
contractual arrangement between firms that jointly develop and share IP that each partner can 
implement in its products. While costly to set up, the contracts detail rights and obligations in the 
partnership to set incentives for the joint research effort. The informal counterpart would be 
knowledge-trading arrangements, which are less costly, but can only handle existing knowledge, 
unless trust has been established. An informal arrangement with weak appropriability is informal 
knowledge-sharing. This arrangement is used if partners want to signal quality and build trust 
through reciprocity instead of earning immediate monetary benefits. Finally, formal standards-
setting consortia select a specification that benefits all participants without joint development of new 
IP. Partners can then jointly license the established standard or benefit from its existence for their 
complementary component development. 
Table 1 about here  
4.1.C. Transaction Costs of Information Transmission 
So far we implicitly assumed information to flow perfectly within existing networks. But not 
all information can be codified and, therefore, information transmission is never perfect. For 
example, certain types of information can only be passed on by demonstration that requires physical 
presence. This kind of information is very costly to transmit across clusters. Transaction costs in the 
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transmission of information, as we shall see, influence the size and reach of a network, which in turn 
affects the type of IP that is created in different networks. 
Scientists transfer knowledge in two ways: through publication of results and through direct 
communication, for example as they collaborate on a project. There is evidence that knowledge 
transfer that is closely linked to commercialization of inventions (namely patents) can only happen 
through more direct collaboration (Gittelmann 2007; Beaucage and Baudry 2006; Jaffe et al. 1993), 
which requires geographic proximity. In particular, Gittelmann (2007) documents the presence of 
two types of networks in the biotech industry. Her data has patent-to-paper and paper-to-paper 
citations, exploiting the practice in this industry to publish applied papers, while at the same time 
applying for a patent on the same topic. She finds highly active research collaborations within a 50-
mile radius, which covered 18 percent of all papers in the sample. At the opposite extreme, about 60 
percent of collaborators are located more than 800 miles away from each other. Of these 60 percent, 
more than one-third involved at least one non-U.S. coauthor and another one-third involved 
cooperation between researchers from both coasts of the United States.27 She finds that local 
networks foster patentable knowledge, while collaborations between distant researchers produce 
highly cited scientific papers.  Teams within the same cluster receive almost seven times more 
citations from patents than distant teams, while in scientific papers the former receive only about 
one-fifth the citations of the latter. Thus proximity is relevant for patentable innovation, but not for 
scientific research. In the latter, the small cost of information transmission for digitized knowledge 
makes the quality of the match more important than the cost of transmission.  
                                                 
27  Similarly, in their sample of Canadian biotech-patents, Beaucage and Beaudry (2006) find that one-quarter of the 
collaborators live outside of Canada. 
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While it seems that firms need to be well connected in their local clusters to create patentable 
innovation, they also need access to a broad knowledge pool. Since adding ties to their networks is 
costly, firms face a tradeoff between local connectedness and access to globally available 
knowledge. Schilling and Phelps (2007) document that small-world connectivity (a situation of 
intense clustering with sparse bridge ties across clusters) can help overcome this tradeoff. They 
show that networks of firms in equipment and pharmaceuticals that exhibit these small-world 
properties have significantly higher rates of knowledge creation as measured by firms’ patent 
output.  
This may suggest that geographic distance is the main barrier to get access to global research 
networks. But distance may just proxy for other barriers. Trust has been identified to be one of them 
(Foray and Steinmueller 2002). Agrawal, et al. (2007) argue that trust is easily established within 
the Indian ethnic community and information exchange in informal agreements should thereby be 
facilitated.28 They find that co-ethnicity can indeed substitute for co-location, and ethnic networks 
help transfer knowledge across clusters that could otherwise be shared only locally. This indicates 
that co-ethnicity facilitates bridge ties, which are expected to be more valuable for researchers in 
that they are linked to higher rates of IP creation. Since research networks are becoming ethnically 
more diverse, this might reduce the importance of local clusters in favor of wider networks.29  
We summarize subsection 4.1 by simply stating that the lone-wolf researcher is an 
endangered species. Evidence suggests that the development of basic scientific research as well as 
                                                 
28  Rauch and Trindade (2002) document how both trust and information-sharing within a Chinese ethnic network 
across all countries increases trade. 
29  Kerr (2006) documents the increasing importance of inventors of different ethnicities within the United States. The 
share of patents with at least one Chinese inventor named on the patent doubled from about three percent to six 
percent from 1980 to 1997. Similarly for Indian inventors, whose share also doubled from two percent to four 
percent over the same period. In some industries, such as chemicals and computers, the share of patents with at least 
one non-U.S. inventor increased to almost 30 percent. 
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appropriable knowledge frequently happens in teams that can even stretch internationally. These 
teams are rarely exclusive and do not have clearly defined boundaries. Collaborators in one project 
may add a researcher in the next, with each researcher of the group exploring projects with third 
parties. Combining these links of researchers defines networks of scientists (or what we have called 
knowledge platforms),  These entities exhibit network effects, for adding researchers increases the 
knowledge base for all researchers in the network, and thus should spur development of IP. 
Further, networks develop by stage of knowledge and IP creation.  Those involved in 
projects close to commercialization are localized in clusters of geographic proximity, while 
networks involved in basic research are more geographically dispersed. Different types of 
intellectual outputs, such as patented information and research papers, and the networks that create 
them, are complementary to each other.  Knowledge published in research papers builds the 
foundation for new patents, and patents spur new basic research.  Networks are inherently complex 
structures, which makes them hard to analyze. However, their importance in knowledge creation 
makes them an important issue for further study. 
4.2. Developing Research Networks: The Role of Government Policy  
The model and examples in the previous subsection allow the categorization of government 
policies that can promote the formation of networks. Government policy can increase network 
effects through enlarging the installed base of knowledge. It can promote policies to reduce 
coordination costs in research networks. It can also reduce resistance in the transmission of 
information. We analyze these government policies in this subsection. Theoretical considerations 
suggest focusing on the formation of bridge ties.  
4.2.A. Increasing the Network Effect in Knowledge Platforms  
The network effects in knowledge platforms are due to the recombination of information 
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from a diverse knowledge base. Therefore, government policy could try to increase the diversity of 
the knowledge base. An indirect way to do this is to broaden applicability of the technological field 
that the government wants to develop.  
In the case of the internet, three policies helped to develop it predominantly as a U.S. 
invention (Mowery and Simcoe 2002), all of which contributed to reinforce network effects, either 
within the community of internet researchers or in the final use of the internet. First, the Department 
of Defense supported generic research in computer technology, with the understanding that the 
civilian and the defense computer markets are complementary to each other, and that a larger market 
size could spur innovation and therefore benefit both segments. Thus, opening research in computers 
to the civilian market increased the diversity of knowledge. Second, the market power of incumbent 
telecommunication companies was reduced through antitrust and regulatory policies, arguably 
increasing the competitive provision of access to the internet.  
Third, in contrast to Europe, funding was in some cases made conditional on the resulting 
technology being non-proprietary. For example, the National Science Foundation made funding for 
internet connections dependent on the use of the freely available TCP/IP transmission protocol. This 
broadened the installed base of internet connections and increased the incentives for researchers to 
work on internet-related topics. The willingness to accept foreign inventions and incorporate them 
into the overall structure (namely the document format HTML and the retrieval protocol HTTP) as 
well as the availability of free internet software like the MOSAIC browser further promoted the 
internet to grow. All of these factors combined to create a vast diversity of potentially recombinant 
knowledge. While U.S. policy did not intervene directly into IP markets, the indirect measures for 
increased market size and competitiveness within the United States ensured that a large portion of 
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this new knowledge originated there.  This fact supported positive implications for competitive 
advantage of the firms involved. 
4.2.B. Lowering Coordination Costs 
The literature that we have discussed thus far offers almost no suggestions on how to 
improve internal coordination within networks. However, suggestions on how to improve external 
coordination costs between networks of researchers are implicit in the literature, most prominently 
in the case of standardization.  For example, if appropriation of knowledge is hard to achieve, 
coordination for standardization should start early in the process. Some standards-setting 
institutions, like the DIN in Germany, have already incorporated this concept into their activities.  
That is, standards are developed along with new technologies.  
Should the parties that create intellectual property within a standards body regulate their 
coordination efforts themselves or is there a role for government activity? DeLacey et al. (2006) 
compare a self-regulatory standardization body (the IEEE in the United States) with a state-
sponsored one (the SAC in China) for the case of wireless computer networking. They argue that the 
IEEE process for establishing the 802.11i standard was transparent and rules-based and offered the 
opportunity of participation for any interested party. In contrast, the Chinese government chose to 
limit participation in the development of WAPI, the Chinese standard competing with 802.11i, to 24 
hand-picked firms. DeLacey et al. argue that both arrangements may have been reasonable given the 
specific technical, economic and political environments prevalent in the United States and China. 
However, the very nature of the approaches, top-down, non-market based in the case of 
China versus bottom-up in the United States, and the fact that Chinese firms had no track-record of 
implementation, while the U.S. standard was developed by players with proven track records, 
hampered the chances for the Chinese standard to be approved at a higher level, namely the ISO. 
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Chinese government policy was successful in improving external coordination of research efforts 
(specifically defining the size and structure of the network of participating researchers), since WAPI 
would likely not have been developed in China otherwise. So the policy would have been successful 
if the issue had been one of purely domestic interest. But the policy did not fully recognize the 
requirements for the approval it was targeting, with immediate effects on the wealth positions 
through IP protection.  Had WAPI become the ISO standard, substantive licensing fees would have 
been transferred to Chinese companies and away from U.S. and Western European companies. This 
implies that there may be a role for government policy to improve external coordination of research 
efforts, but a bottom-up policy that makes full use of market forces and utilizes the know-how of 
experienced firms is more likely to succeed.  
4.2.C. Facilitating Bridge Ties 
Rauch and Watson’s (2007) model suggests that government policy should facilitate bridge 
ties, which can be achieved in two ways. One approach is for the government to sponsor trade fairs, 
conferences, and firm and campus visits by researchers. This reduces search costs and therefore 
unambiguously increases the probability of forming bridge ties. An alternative policy suggested by 
the model (however, with somewhat ambiguous consequences), might be to encourage non-compete 
covenants in employment contracts. These prevent researchers that leave a firm to use IP from the 
original firm for their new professional endeavors.30 This policy will unambiguously increase the 
number of bridge partnerships. However, this outcome may not be as beneficial as it seems.  Even 
under imperfect enforcement of the policy, researchers who do not want to stay with their current 
employer will not only increase their search effort outside their cluster, they will also accept bridge 
                                                 
30  The range of IP protected under non-compete covenants can range from tacit knowledge to patents and customer 
lists. While the first two are of special interest in the context of research networks, the third example also constitutes 
IP and documents the relevance of non-compete clauses in the context of IPR.  
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ties that are of lower quality in order to avoid legal punishment based on the covenant. So the 
overall effect is ambiguous in theory and can be outright damaging in practice, as in the following 
example.  
In particular, Gilson (1999) presents an example where non-compete covenants may have 
backfired. He argues that California was more successful at fostering computer research networks 
than Massachusetts because non-compete covenants prevented workers from moving freely between 
companies within the latter state. The absence of similar regulation allowed for larger knowledge 
creation in California. The intuition is as follows. Incremental innovation is essential for the 
development of computer technology. Knowledge flows through moving personnel broaden the 
overall knowledge base for all firms. These knowledge flows were hampered on Route 128 in 
Massachusetts because of non-compete clauses, providing an advantage for California’s Silicon 
Valley, where transmission of tacit knowledge was easier. Interpreting these results in our model, 
researchers on Route 128 could not move to other firms within the same district, so cluster ties were 
prohibited. This only left bridge ties outside of local clusters, either leading to a brain-drain from 
Route 128, or forcing researchers to stay within the same firm. Either way, the creation of a local 
knowledge base was hindered. 
Schilling and Phelps’ (2007) results suggest that active coordination of research networks, as 
happened in the European Union’s EUREKA program and the Japanese METI strategy, can 
contribute to improving connectivity of local cluster networks on a national and international scale. 
It remains to be seen, however, whether these efforts will be successful, for while the authors’ 
econometric results are robust and statistically significant, their economic importance is on average 
fairly small and decays quickly with time. Their results also only address the additional quantity of 
patents but if bridge ties offer access to higher-quality knowledge, it should lead to higher patent 
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quality. More research, including analysis of measures of patent or paper quality (such as citations), 
is needed to determine the contribution of bridge ties, and in particular government-induced bridge 
ties, to research performance. 
Finally, policies that facilitate the education of foreign talent and immigration of highly 
qualified researchers into a country can contribute to the country’s pool of ethnic research networks. 
Chellaraj et al. (2007) find the marginal productivity of an additional graduate student admitted to 
the United States to be 0.62 patent awards. While this has to be taken with a grain of salt in the 
context of the discussion on brain drain from developing countries, it likely contributed to the 
current U.S. technological leadership. However, it would be important to study the roles of ethnic 
networks in the early phases of a researcher’s career to learn about the economic importance of 
ethnic network formation. 
4.3. Optimal IPR Protection in the Presence of Network Effects 
Two characteristics of the software industry make it a good case study for many of the issues 
in this chapter. First, it is an industry in which concerns about IPR, especially copyright 
infringement on a global scale, play an important role. For example, the Software and Information 
Industry Association (SIIA 2006) states that “the software industry loses about U.S. $11 billion to 
U.S. $12 billion in revenue to software piracy annually. Of the billions of dollars lost to piracy, a 
little less than half are lost in Asia, where China and Indonesia are the biggest offenders.”31 
According to SIIA (2000), piracy rates in China in 1999 were 91 percent, and in Vietnam 98 
percent, with Asia overall averaging 47 percent. Given these estimates one might ask why software 
producers do not use copyright law to better protect their products against piracy? 
                                                 
31  These numbers carry a high degree of uncertainty. Havoscope (2006) report numbers almost three times as high 
based on data from the Business Software Alliance.  
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 One answer may simply be that the cost of protection is too high. However, one strand of 
the literature is devoted to an alternative explanation, related to the second important characteristic 
of software. As reviewed in the introduction, there is substantial evidence that its consumption 
exhibits network effects, for variety of reasons. First, there are post-purchase costs to software, such 
as training and customization. The more users there are of one particular program, the more likely it 
is to be supported through manuals, services, and other forms of assistance (an indirect network 
effect). Second, consumer's valuation of programs increases if they allow file transfers between 
users (a direct network effect).   
A simple model of copyright protection can then explain how a low level of anti-piracy 
protection may be profit-maximizing. The key ingredient of the story is that the network effects 
apply to all users, legitimate and pirating ones alike. Allowing piracy increases the size of the 
network, thus increasing the value of the product to legitimate buyers, and allowing firms to charge 
them higher prices. Conner and Rumelt (1991), Takeyama (1994), and Slive and Bernhardt (1998) 
model this effect for a monopolist software maker in a market with heterogeneous consumers, the 
latter assumption being necessary to ensure that both pirating and legitimate users co-exist. 
The basic mechanics of these models can be understood with the aid of the following 
example. Take a continuum of consumers, distributed uniformly in a square of side one, as shown 
by the solid square in Figure 2. The horizontal axis represents each consumer’s valuation for the 
software. Without network effects, consumers are uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1]. With 
network effects, consumer i’s valuation is: 
,Muv ii γ+=  ( 2 ) 
where ui is a parameter uniformly distributed on the unit interval, M is the mass of total users 
(legitimate and pirating), and γ is a positive parameter that represents the strength of the network 
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effect. Note that the distribution will shift horizontally as M changes. In the language of Section 3, 
we assume that consumers’ expectations are fulfilled in equilibrium, such that their forecast of the 
mass of users turns out to be the actual mass. 
The vertical axis on the figure represents each consumer’s cost of pirating, written as: 
,τ+= ii ct  ( 3 ) 
where ci is an intrinsic cost (perhaps the psychic cost of breaking the law) and τ is an additional cost 
imposed on all consumers by the firm through its anti-piracy protection efforts, which are assumed 
to be costless to the firm. Also shown on the figure is the price (p), which may be assumed to be the 
ex-post equilibrium price.  
Figure 2 about here 
Let us consider what different consumers do. There are three possible choices, depicted in 
different regions of the figure: the consumer buys the software (B), pirates it (P), or decides not to 
use the software (N). For example, in the B region (ignoring for the moment the dashed square and 
the shaded areas), consumers buy because their individual valuation is larger than the price ( pvi > ); 
and because it is more costly to pirate than to buy ( pti > ). By contrast, in the lower trapezoid 
region, consumers decide to pirate because the cost of doing so is lower than their valuation ( ii vt < ) 
and lower than the price ( pti < ). Other cases are analyzed analogously.32  
Now suppose that the software maker increases the cost of pirating to τ'>τ. Then the new 
distribution of consumers is represented by the dashed square. If there were no network effects the 
square would just move up as each consumer retains his valuation and faces a higher cost of 
                                                 
32  Other examples are possible. For example if ,Mp γ<  then all consumers would use the software (and therefore M 
= 1). Our goal is simply to illustrate the main properties of the model, not to cover exhaustively all variants. 
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pirating. Thus, absent network effects, the shaded region on the right would not be there. The upper 
shaded area represents the additional number of buyers at constant price p. Intuitively, by increasing 
the cost of pirating, the firm induces some of the pirates (those in the region just below the B-P 
border with a mass equal to the upper shaded area) to become buyers. Thus it would always be 
profit-increasing for the firm to raise protection to the highest possible level.  
When we consider network effects, the situation is different. Note that a mass of former 
pirates (represented by the shaded region on the bottom) no longer illegally copies software. Some 
former pirates became buyers, as we mentioned before. But some others cross over to become non-
users. These are low-valuation consumers for whom the cost of pirating increased enough to deter 
them, but who do not find it worthwhile to buy. We see that the total mass of users decreases, 
lowering the value for each user, and shifting the distribution to the left. This shift causes some 
previous buyers to give up using the software. They are a set lying close and to the right of the N-B 
border, with measure identical to the shaded region on the right. It is clear from the figure that, 
depending on the relative sizes of the shaded regions on the top and on the right, the firm might end 
up with a lower demand from legitimate buyers than it had with the lower level of protection. In 
particular, assuming a reasonable marginal cost of software production, this lower demand will 
cause the firm to lower its price (we forego here the detailed analysis of the fulfilled expectations 
that we performed in section 3). This is the key to the result mentioned above: with a sufficiently 
strong network effect it may decrease profits to protect software to the maximum possible level, 
even when such protection is costless to the firm. Takeyama (1994) further shows that lowering the 
level of protection from the maximum increases welfare, which is an important result because the 
welfare impact on buyers is ambiguous.  On the one hand they benefit from the larger network; but 
on the other they end up paying higher prices.   
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These models link in a natural way with international issues, because they assume consumers 
have heterogeneous valuations and different costs of pirating. Nowhere are these assumptions more 
likely to hold true (and to a higher degree) than in the global arena. For example, differences in anti-
piracy enforcement levels may make piracy costs widely divergent for different countries. Of 
course, a richer model of piracy in the global context (which is missing from the literature) would 
have to take into account that the strength of the network effect is likely to be weaker across national 
borders, but may not be totally absent. For example, users in different countries may congregate in 
the same internet forum to discuss user tricks of trade.  
We note that one way to interpret this literature is as an instance of price discrimination. The 
software producer, in effect, charges a price of zero to one kind of “customer,” the pirates. Note that, 
as Figure 2 shows, one way to prevent piracy is simply to lower the price. But price discrimination 
may still dominate a single-price policy. 
Useful departures from this literature that we have not yet touched upon include strategic 
issues. The presence of network effects complicates the models of oligopolistic competition and 
trade in interesting ways. If there is a software maker in each country, for example, and we add a 
time dimension, one firm’s product will almost inevitably become the de facto standard as it grows 
in network size (Markovich 2004). It may then be in the best interests of either country to subsidize 
exports in order to create a preemptive customer base. 
A strategic model of copyright protection in software (but without the dynamic or 
international aspects mentioned above) is analyzed in a Cournot setting by Shy and Thisse (1999). 
Note that price competition may act in the same way as low protection of IPR, by extending the 
network effect to a larger customer base. Suppose that the firms can choose between a high or a low 
level of copyright protection before they engage in price competition. Then the key margin is what 
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impact piracy has on legitimate sales. If network effects are weak, then firms choose a high level of 
protection, since the reduction in pirates does not significantly affect the number of buyers. If by 
contrast the network effects are strong, then both firms choose not to protect their IPR. Rather, they 
engage in price competition, trying to build a larger customer base. 
 
5. Strategic Issues for Goods with Network Externalities and Standards 
In the previous section we focused on network effects occurring at the level of creation and 
transmission of knowledge. We now turn our attention to market outcomes in which the driving 
force is the presence of network effects in consumption. The literature has emphasized the strategic 
consequences of such network effects, which can be divided into two types: private firms’ strategies 
in the presence of network effects and government policies addressing those effects.  
At the end of the previous section, we have already addressed one special case of IPR 
protection, the case of firms facing copyright piracy. To isolate the effect of piracy, we treated 
software as if it were an indivisible good, could be consumed in isolation and contained only one 
copyright. We will now consider more complex goods with deeper interactions among IP, standards 
and network effects. Note that we are no longer addressing violations of IPR, but rather the strategic 
but legitimate use of IP by its owners or countries in order to gain some advantage. Such 
interactions are only possible in a world with intellectual property rights and we discuss why 
weakening IPR may lead to different outcomes. 
The technology for color television is an example of such a complex good. It is made of 
many complementary parts and services (for example the antennas, the TV sets, the signal 
transmission), which are made by numerous different companies. To guarantee interoperability of 
these parts and services, they need compatible interfaces between them, which often need to be 
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standardized. In the case of color television a few standards were created (PAL, SECAM, and 
NTSC). 
Thus, there exists a triple overlap in product characteristics.  There are complex goods that 
benefit from standardization through interoperability requirements, goods that exhibit consumption 
network effects, and goods with a strong IP component. Some of the questions that arise for these 
products deal with private firms’ strategies, when no firm is the single owner of the total IP content 
of the good. For example, firms may attempt to leverage their partial ownership of the IP content of 
some good in order to dominate the whole market. A different question is whether all types of IPR 
are the same in their ability to enable firms to achieve market dominance. Other questions relate to 
government policy towards standards.  For example, should governments choose the single country, 
the region, or the world as a whole for the scope of a standard? What are some types of different 
institutional arrangements in the setting of standards, and what is their impact on the outcome? We 
address such questions in this section. 
5.1. Government Strategies in the Choice of Scope: National or International 
In designing their IPR policies, countries face a spectrum of choices that run from the purest 
national to the most international approaches. Each country might, for example: (i) insist on 
domestic registration or some form of adaptation for recognition of any IPR; (ii) establish 
agreements with other countries for the mutual recognition of IPR; or (iii) join international 
organizations for multilateral recognition of IPR.33 If the product with IP content exhibits network 
effects, then the problem is complicated by some of the strategic and welfare considerations that we 
have been considering in this chapter. Goods that have strong IP content and exhibit network effects 
                                                 
33 For details on international treaties on intellectual property rights, see Maskus (2000).  
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are also subject to standards, as we saw. The literature that we review here has focused on this 
problem of geographic scope for standards. 
Several mutually incompatible standards can exist in the world at the same time, especially 
across different countries. For example, there are different standards for color TV or for so-called 
third-generation mobile telephones. Governments may choose to mutually recognize each others’ 
standards or adhere to an internationally recognized standard. Mutual recognition of standards 
decreases some transaction costs, but it also leads to the co-existence of different standards within 
one country, which may be detrimental to consumers.34 An example is mobile telephony, for which 
many countries allow several standards to co-exist. By contrast, color TV is an example of the 
second approach, for hardly any country accepts more than one standard, and most countries adhere 
instead to one of the few international standards. 
Gandal and Shy (2001) analyze the first concept, the mutual recognition of standards. Their 
model has three countries, which they call α, β, and γ. There are three firms, one from each country, 
called a, b, and c, respectively. They assume a circular market in each country (as in Salop 1979), 
which for country α is depicted in Figure 3. Each of the three firms sells a horizontally differentiated 
brand, represented by the firm’s position on the circle. A continuum of heterogeneous consumers is 
uniformly distributed along the circle, their position on the circle representing each consumer’s ideal 
brand. To account for consumption network externalities, Gandal and Shy augment consumers’ 
utility by d (2d) if two (three) of the brands share the same standard. They also assume conversion 
costs in that if country α does not recognize the standard of firm c, say, then the firm has to incur a 
cost to convert its variety to country α’s standard. Each consumer has a unit-elastic demand for the 
                                                 
34  The term “mutual recognition” is used both in the sense of recognizing other countries’ standards and of accepting 
exporting countries’ testing procedures to meet an importing country's standards. In this chapter we refer to the 
former meaning (see, for example, Costinot (2006) for this use). 
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good. In deciding which brand to buy, the consumer takes into account: the prices of each brand, the 
distance between the consumer’s ideal brand and the brands available, and the expected network 
effect for each brand. Given prices, we define Xi,j to be the consumer that is indifferent between 
brands i and j.  
Gandal and Shy (2001) argue that if governments are restricted in their policy choice, such 
that they can only either recognize all other countries’ standards or recognize no standards at all, 
then they always recognize all standards.35 Simply put, this is because universal recognition 
maximizes consumers’ benefits and minimizes conversion costs. They also consider standardization 
unions, defined as treaties of mutual recognition between two of the three countries, and a common 
policy (i.e., recognition or non-recognition) with respect to the third country.36 If such unions are 
allowed, the outcome depends on the relative importance of the network effect versus the conversion 
costs. If conversion costs dominate, and they are moderate to large, standardization unions are 
formed, potentially even leading to complete exclusion of the third country’s goods.  
Figure 3 about here 
Barrett and Yang (2001) address the second issue, namely the incentives of a single country 
to adhere to an international standard and forego its national standard. Their model is based on Katz 
and Shapiro (1985), and like them (but unlike Gandal and Shy), Barrett and Yang allow for the 
possibility of partial compatibility between products. For example, a spreadsheet user may be able to 
see files produced with different software, but may have to reformat them in order to do so. Barrett 
                                                 
35  The interpretation of their results is complicated by the fact that they assume (p. 370 and 377) that “if all foreign 
brands are recognized, the gross utility from each brand is Vk=V+2d,” where V is the non-network portion of the 
utility and 2d >0 is what is added due to the network effect. To the extent that recognizing foreign standards allows 
the number of standards to increase, the network effect would actually decrease.  
36  One example of a standardization union may be the European Union, whose rules require each member state to 
accept products from all other member states if the product conforms with the standards of the originating country 
and it is actually marketed there (Costinot 2006). 
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and Yang extend the model to include two countries. Suppose that a product can be horizontally 
differentiated along the unit interval, as represented in Figure 4. Initially the home country produces 
the variety at 1, while the foreign country produces variety β (the international standard). If β = 1, 
then the foreign and domestic varieties are completely compatible, while if β = 0, they are 
completely incompatible. Consumers do not care which variety they consume, except that the less 
compatible two varieties are, the less network benefits consumers get across varieties. The home 
country can pick a new technology, denoted by α. It can choose to mandate that the new technology 
conform to the international standard (α=β) or make it conform to its own old standard (α=1). 
Barrett and Yang assume a cost function C(α), such that C'(α) < 0 and C(1)=0, to convert the old 
domestic technology into technology α.  
Figure 4 about here 
They show that if unconstrained by any mandate by the government, the domestic firms 
would choose a technology that is intermediate between the international standard and the old 
domestic standard, though never equal to the former. That is, β < α ≤ 1. By positioning themselves 
in an intermediate position, domestic firms maximize the combination of network externality that 
new customers get both from old customers and the customers of foreign products. Furthermore, by 
not going all the way to β they also save on conversion costs.37  
Barrett and Yang also argue that the optimal government policy in the home country is not 
necessarily to harmonize with the foreign standard. This situation is called a lock-in effect, in which 
a prevalent standard already exists in the country, and the decision is biased towards the existing 
                                                 
37  There is one scenario in which the international harmonization result (α = β) is more likely to happen. This would be 
a case in which the old customers were allowed to switch either to the international standard or the new domestic 
standard. Such a modification of the model would be most relevant in the long run, as firms stop servicing obsolete 
technologies, and the expectation is that the old technology would disappear. 
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standard.  In devising what course to take, governments consider the consumer surplus in their 
countries only.38 Consumers gain with an intermediate standard because network externalities with 
all consumers are maximized, and conversion costs are relatively low, leading to low prices. 
These results imply that domestic firms’ technology choices have an impact on the volume 
of trade. As α approaches β, domestic firms’ sales go down and foreign firms’ sales increase. 
Therefore, international harmonization in standards increases the volume of trade, a point that has 
empirical relevance (see Moenius 2004). Using Barrett and Yang’s (2001) paper, we can discuss the 
importance of IPR in this context. Those authors observe that, despite the fact that the globally most 
desirable outcome is complete harmonization, the most likely outcome is the parallel development of 
incompatible standards in different countries. This outcome can be avoided if one country or one 
firm in a country becomes the leader,39 creating a candidate international standard which is then 
adopted by all countries of the world. To a large extent this is what happened with personal 
computers. However, to provide the leader with incentives to create such a standard, international 
IPR protection is necessary. 
Therefore, one seemingly pessimistic conclusion from this literature is that standards are 
unlikely to become unified across countries, with consequent costs to consumer welfare. This is not 
the only possibility, however.  An important point is that standards that differ across countries 
convey information about local tastes and technology, thus lowering adaptation costs and helping 
overcome information barriers. There is also a welfare gain through a broader variety of products 
                                                 
38  The authors simplify the analysis by assuming monopolistic competition with free entry, leading to zero producer 
surplus. Furthermore, the assumption in this paper is that consumers do not get consumption network externalities 
across national borders. Rauch and Trindade (2006) argue in the context of cultural goods that such externalities are 
indeed possible, although with some dampening across international borders. 
39  A likely candidate would be a large country. Questions about size have not, to our knowledge, been adequately 
addressed in this literature. 
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available to consumers. Finally, a variety of standards that represent local technology and IP 
broadens the world's knowledge base, which we identified as relevant for the creation of new IP.40  
Jensen and Thursby (1996) analyze the question of national standardization policy if the 
outcome of technological progress is uncertain. They assume that there are two countries, with one 
firm in each country. Firms can engage in costly R&D with the goal of discovering either 
technology A or technology B. Once a firm discovers a new technology, it obtains a patent and the 
other firm may only engage in R&D for the undiscovered technology. There are two differences 
with the work already mentioned. First, this process is uncertain, in that either firm may discover a 
technology first (in which case it becomes a monopolist until the other firm discovers the other 
technology). Moreover, governments may commit to either technology A or technology B as a 
standard before any firms have invented the technology. This is what we could call pre-emptive 
standard setting (which as we shall see also plays an important role in private firms’ interactions).41 
Second, Jensen and Tursby seem to have in mind a scientific search for a general effect, for 
which it is not clear what the appropriate technology would be. For example, electronics firms may 
want to develop a system for color TV, or pharmaceutical companies may target a specific disease, 
but in both cases they do not know how to reach their goal. It is reasonable to imagine that different 
firms, pursuing independent paths of discovery, arrive at different means to achieve largely the same 
objective.  
                                                 
40 Rauch and Trindade (2003) work out a model of information barriers in an international setting. Moenius (2004) 
documents the trade-promoting effect of harmonized standards as well as differing standards for complex goods.  
Maskus et al. (2004) document product adaptation costs for developing countries. Chen and Mattoo (2006) find that 
when countries engage in standardization unions – as defined above – the exports of excluded countries’ products 
with low R&D expenses decrease, which is consistent with an interaction between standards and learning. 
41  How can governments commit to a technology standard before it is discovered? One way is to commit to the 
technology of the firm in one’s own country, whatever that turns out to be. Another way is to commit to a type of 
approach. For example, the domestic pharmaceutical firm may be taking a gene-therapy approach, while the foreign 
firm takes a chemical approach. The government may simply declare that the former will be the only acceptable 
standard. 
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Jensen and Thursby also assume that A is the superior technology, in that it provides larger 
profits once discovered than technology B, and that the foreign firm has an advantage in developing 
it. Considering first the equilibrium in which firms engage in R&D in the absence of any 
government policy, the foreign (domestic) firm engages in R&D for technology A (B).42 But if the 
domestic country declares a standard in favor of the inferior technology B, both firms are more 
likely to do R&D on technology B, to the detriment of the superior technology A. Therefore 
standardization policy has a direct bearing on the process of IP creation, and it may lead to an 
inefficient result, when a pre-emptive standard is declared for the inferior technology. 
5.2. Private Strategic Interaction in the Creation of Standards 
Next we consider the interactions among firms themselves, allowing no role for government 
policy. For complex goods, as we have argued, the different IPR may belong to many different 
firms, whose interests may not be aligned. Furthermore, the IP embodied in the good may have 
different degrees of importance. In particular, the literature distinguishes between “essential” and 
“non-essential” IPR. Intellectual property rights are essential when the good cannot be produced 
without them, while non-essential IPR can be side-stepped, most likely because there are 
alternatives, or because they protect elective add-ons. In this subsection we illustrate the importance 
of essential IPR in the creation of standards. 
We do so with the aid of one case study, namely the GSM standard for second-generation 
mobile telephony. To get a sense of the complexity of the picture, Bekkers et al. (2002) found 140 
                                                 
42  One reason why firms do not always engage in R&D for technology A is the stochastic nature of the process of 
discovery, and network externalities. Since the domestic firm has a finite probability of finding technology B before 
the foreign firm finds technology A, it can be a monopoly for some time. Given network externalities, technology B 
becomes valuable for consumers, allowing the domestic firm to extract a large payoff. 
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individually distinguishable essential IPR embodied in this standard!43 The four largest owners of 
essential IPR were Motorola (with 27 patents), Nokia (19), Alcatel (14), and Philips (13). It is 
remarkable that the first three became part of the five dominant players in this market, along with 
Ericsson and Siemens. Bekkers et al. explain how these five firms gained their position through a 
complex interaction of factors, a primary one being the role played by Motorola. Through its U.S. 
experience Motorola was particularly attuned to the importance of patents and pursued from the 
beginning an aggressive policy of patent protection. When it became the holder of the most essential 
patents, it used its strong position to negotiate cross-licensing agreements with other holders of 
essential patents (namely Nokia and Alcatel), allowing them jointly to shut out some other firms 
from the GSM market. Thus, the possession of essential IPR helps in leveraging one’s advantage.  
The interesting aspect is that owning essential IPR is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition to gain strategic advantage. For example, Philips decided in the early 1990s to largely 
abandon this market, in spite of its initial advantage (however, this literature does not explain why – 
or whether – this was the best course for Philips). The case of Ericsson is even more interesting, in 
that it exploits the concept of knowledge platform. Initially, Ericsson adhered to the old regime, in 
which patents were considered redundant in telecommunications since the market was dominated by 
one state-owned company. Therefore, Ericsson did not register patents on most of its IP. However, it 
was still a central player in the industry, through its connections with other firms.44 Thus, Ericsson 
                                                 
43  They initially found 380 IPR but whittled the list down based on the likelihood that some were different filings for 
the same content. Note that the number is likely to underestimate the essential IPR, since they restrict IPR to only 
those items that were actually patented. As we detail below, Ericsson was able to play a central role in this industry, 
even though it did not patent its IPR. 
44  In particular, Ericsson was the main proponent of the GSM standard. We use the word “central” in the sense of 
network analysis. Using graph theory, centrality is defined in a number of ways. For example, “betweenness 
centrality” is higher the more times an agent is in the shortest path between two other agents. In this sense Ericsson 
was by far the most central player in the industry, according to the calculations in Bekkers et al.. 
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performed the role of gatekeeper. Finally, it remains to be explained how Siemens gained 
prominence, even though it held neither essential patents nor a central role. According to Bekkers et 
al, this was due to Siemens owning technology that was strongly complementary to Motorola’s, 
inducing Motorola to strike an alliance with it. 
This case study highlights how complex the web of interactions can be. Unfortunately, we 
know of no attempts to model these interactions at any formal level. We list below some of the 
relevant analytical points that could be addressed by such models. 
(1) What are the incentives of the firm to join an alliance versus going it alone, with special 
consideration to the global market? Note that a firm that pursues an individual strategy may hope 
that its product becomes a de facto standard in the market, perhaps due to a tipping effect.  
(2) What are the welfare implications? Here, we are specifically thinking of the tension that 
arises between private ownership, as emphasized by IPR, and the public interest that is vested in 
standards.  
(3) What is the optimal government strategy? Governments may try to influence the international 
adoption of a standard from their own country through the creation of an early installed base as 
described in Funk and Methe (2001).  Given network externalities, this is more likely to happen if 
the standard originates in a large country, in what could be called a “network home market effect.” 
This seems to be the case in third-generation cellular telephones (Glimstedt 2001).  
5.3. Institutional Aspects of Standard Setting 
The previous two subsections dealt primarily with the decisions of either one government or 
one single firm, as it engaged in strategic standard-setting behavior vis-à-vis other governments or 
firms. They had to do with the purely strategic aspects of IPR policies, and the institutional aspects 
lay in the background. We now consider the latter in more detail. We suppose that governments or 
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firms engage in a process of negotiation and ask how the institutional design of the forums in which 
they do so influences the outcome. 
In a recent paper, Costinot (2006) studies two types of standard-setting arrangements.  These 
are the “National Treatment” (NT) principle, under which a country is obliged to accept any imports 
that conform to the standards that the government imposes on its own firms, and the “Mutual 
Recognition” (MR) principle, under which a country commits to accept any imports that conform to 
the standards of the country of origin. The former regime is most similar to the rules of the World 
Trade Organization, while the latter regime applies in the European Union. Costinot considers a 
model of two countries with one firm in each country, and with consumption externalities.  
In the case of compatibility standards (for example the standard for color TV), suppose that 
there are two standards, d and f. It is costless for the domestic (foreign) firm to produce under 
standard d (f), but each firm incurs a cost to produce in the other standard. Consumers do not care 
which standard is sold, but they benefit if only one standard exists in their country. Costinot begins 
by showing that the efficient outcome is for each country to impose no standard if the network effect 
is weak (by allowing the foreign firm to sell with its own standard), and to impose the domestic 
standard if the network effect is strong. This is because in the first case the costs of standardization 
dominate the benefits to consumers, and vice-versa for the second case.  
Suppose now that both governments can unilaterally and simultaneously decide on a policy. 
Then both governments will impose the domestic standard on the foreign firm, just as they do (by 
definition) under the NT regime. In this case the government only takes into account the benefits to 
consumers from having a unified standard, not the cost imposed on the foreign firm. Note that in the 
NT regime, the home country decides on the standard for both firms in a single market (the home 
market). Therefore, it takes fully into account the consumer externality in its market (for consumers 
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of both firms), but it does not consider the costs of the foreign firm. By contrast, in the MR regime, 
the government decides on the standard of a single firm (the home firm) in both markets. In this case 
it takes the full cost of the home firm into account (for products sold in both countries), but it fails to 
take into account the externality for foreign buyers of home products. Costinot shows that in the MR 
regime governments may not impose a standard on foreign firms, even when the level of network 
effects is high enough to justify imposing a single standard on consumers. In this way, they ensure 
that their firm can export with the domestic standard and avoid the cost of adaptation to the foreign 
standard. Thus we conclude that the institutional arrangement matters for the mutual recognition 
policies of each country. 
A different question deals with the institutional arrangements that pertain to standard setting 
(as opposed to standard recognition). Lerner and Tirole (2006) consider the choice of a standard-
setting organization (SSO) by the owners of an IPR (more generally, the choice of a certifier by the 
sponsors of an idea).  In their model, SSOs vary on how independent they are from the IPR owner. 
In practice, certifiers range from being direct arms of industry lobbies to being completely 
independent consumer advocacy organizations. In the model there are three types of economic 
agents: the “owners” of the IPR, the “users” of the product that is made with the IPR, and a 
continuum of “certifiers,” where the latter vary in the degree of toughness towards the owners. Users 
have a utility consisting of three parts: U=a+b+c. Here, a is a common-knowledge parameter 
representing the intrinsic “attractiveness” of the good, b is a stochastic “benefit” variable unknown 
to both the owner and the user, but with known distribution, and c is an endogenous variable of 
“concessions” made by the owner to the user. For example, these could be improvements made to 
the product as a condition for certification. Or, if there is a license price, c could simply be the 
negative of the price. More generally, this parameter c will denote anything that the owner can do to 
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increase the user’s net utility. At the outset, the owner picks c and chooses a certifier among the 
range available. The certifier’s role is to find out the parameter b, and then to either recommend or 
not recommend the product to the users. Each certifier is distinguished by the parameter b*, the 
cutoff for b above which the certifier will recommend the product. For two possible certifiers 
suppose that b*<b**. Then the SSO characterized by b* is less tough (or less independent from the 
industry) than the SSO with b**. 
Users know each certifier’s cutoff value, but never find the actual value for the parameter b. 
Call m(b*) the expected value of the benefit parameter, given the known cutoff of the chosen 
certifier b*. Then risk-neutral consumers will adopt the good if and only if: a + m(b*) + c ≥ 0. 
Given concession c, the owner always chooses the most complacent certifier, such that the equality 
sign applies above. This determines the choice of certifier (b*) as a function of c: 
).(* camb −−= −1  ( 4 ) 
The expected user utility then is a + m(b*) + c = 0, and we assume that users adopt the good. The 
owner’s problem reduces to choosing a concession level c to maximize profits. 
Note that b* and c are inversely related. This can be seem from equation (4), and by noting 
that m(b*) is a monotonically increasing function (the tougher the certifier is, the higher is the 
expected value of the benefit parameters that pass muster). Then, owners face a basic tradeoff: 
choosing a tougher certifier (higher b*) allows fewer concessions (lower c), which given that 
concessions are costly, increases profits conditional on users buying the product. However, because 
the certifier is tougher, she is less likely to endorse the product and consumers are less likely to buy.  
Note that consumers only buy if the good is endorsed. Even then their expected utility is zero, 
therefore if the good is not endorsed the expected utility is less than zero.  
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We highlight only two results from this paper. First, as already mentioned, sponsors will 
always choose the certifier with maximal complacency, given concession c. Second, Lerner and 
Tirole (2006) show that the weaker the IP (the lower is a), the more independent the certifier and the 
more extensive the concessions will be (as represented by a higher b* and higher c*). Intuitively, the 
sponsor compensates for the decrease in a by increasing the concession level and also by increasing 
the independence of the certifier. 
To apply the second result empirically one could consider a set of IPR, ranging in the 
(unobservable) attractiveness parameter a. We would then predict a positive correlation between b* 
and c*. Chiao et al. (2007) have collected a dataset of SSOs and some of their characteristics with 
the goal of checking such a correlation. They use several proxies for how independent the SSO is 
from the industry (how tough it is). These include whether the SSO is a special interest group, 
whether it accepts only corporate membership, and whether it uses a simple majority (as opposed to 
a super-majority or a consensus) as the rule for adoption of a standard. A positive answer to any of 
these questions indicates a low level of independence. To proxy for the concessions required by the 
SSO they use two measures. The first is whether the SSO requires either royalty-free or “reasonable 
and non-discriminatory” licensing of the IPR and the second is whether the firms must commit to a 
conflict-settlement clause within the SSO. A positive answer to these questions reveals extensive 
concessions (high c). They do find a positive correlation between the two variables. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have reviewed a large and varied literature that touches upon one or more 
of the interconnected topics of network effects; standards, IPR, and globalization. In these 
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concluding remarks, we attempt to bring some of the strands of this somewhat disparate literature 
together. 
The issues listed in the last paragraph are related in several ways. As the numerous examples 
spread through the text should show, many products that exhibit network effects can be found in 
technologically advanced sectors, in which IP plays an important role. Furthermore, differences in 
IPR protection across countries automatically require a consideration of international issues. We 
also discussed that for different types of products the relevant scope for the network effects may be 
different (i.e., national versus international), creating room for a rich set of interactions. 
As one example of the complex web of interactions among the various issues, we focused 
especially on standards. Many network effects (in particular indirect ones) come about through the 
need for complementary products or components to work properly with each other, which 
necessitates a well-defined standard. Thus standards must be created in many network industries. 
Indeed, the opposite link also occurs frequently, for standards may be set in order to create or 
enhance a network effect where the effect would otherwise be weak or inexistent.  
Since the IP embodied in standards can be (and very often is) protected, it is hardly possible 
to study standards without a consideration of IPR. We also observe that, given that one single 
standard may have IPR originating in many different firms, and indeed countries, strategic 
interactions among the several actors become of the foremost importance. For instance, firms 
holding essential standards may jeopardize the creation of better standards, or may use their position 
to gain market dominance. Countries may be tempted to wield their large markets to impose their 
domestic standards as de facto norms on the rest of the world, with the correspondent rents accruing 
to domestic firms, but potentially at the cost of efficiency if the inferior standard wins. One slightly 
different aspect of the interaction between standards and globalization is that the existence of 
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different standards across countries may act as a deterrent to trade, which affects the strength of 
potentially realizable network effects, and thus affects welfare beyond the usual reasons. However, 
because standards may act as conveyors of information and diversity of knowledge, allowing 
different standards to co-exist may also be beneficial. 
A different type of international resistance is created if IPR are not well protected in a 
country. This opens up the possibility that some products will not be marketed in that country, with 
potential losses for consumer welfare. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that under some 
circumstances it is actually in the firm’s best interests not to have IPR protection, in order to gain 
advantage through the spread of a wider network. 
We have also pointed out that in the global economy network effects are pervasive not only 
at the level of consumption of IPR-related goods, but also at the levels of creation and transmission 
of the IPR themselves. In particular, one aspect of complex products, such as color television or 
mobile telephony, is that they require step-by-step and incremental processes of innovation. These 
types of innovation pose their own problems. One challenge is the correct design of IPR policies that 
encourage such technological innovations. A different aspect is that the most efficient way to 
produce incremental innovation seems to be through the information flows that occur within 
networks of researchers, which we have called knowledge platforms. Even though there is not a 
perfect one-to-one correspondence between network products (and more generally product 
platforms) and research networks (or knowledge platforms), these often coincide. 
We end this chapter with a word of caution. As we have shown, the multitude of interactions 
are likely to be complex. While they may not always be well understood by the actors in the field 
(where unintended consequences and wrong turns seem to be as much the norm as they are the 
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exception), they also are not always well understood in the economics literature. Therefore, the need 
remains for future research that disentangles the relevant issues. 
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Figure 1: Multiple Demand Equilibria for Network Goods (Economides 1996). 
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Table 1: A Typology of Institutional Structure for Collective Inventions 
 Formal Arrangements Informal Arrangements 
Strong 
Appropriability 
High-technology consortia Knowledge-trading in producer-user 
relations 
Weak 
Appropriability 
Standards-setting consortia Informal knowledge-sharing between the 
members of a community 
Source: Foray and Steinmueller (2002).  
 
 
